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February/March 2002 
The September 11th attacks and events that followed have again focused the U.S. administration, 
intelligence community, and Department of Defense on the danger that weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) could be acquired by adversary states or non-state actors. Two threats in the Middle East 
currently stand out among the rest: Al-Qaeda's announced efforts to make or acquire WMD, and the 
suspected resumption of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.  
Al-Qaeda's WMD Potential 
Osama Bin Laden and his network Al-Qaeda have been seeking to develop chemical, biological, and 
perhaps nuclear weapons capabilities for at least a decade. There is evidence that they have considered 
developing biological agents such as anthrax, botulinum toxin and ricin. U.S. troops inspecting terrorist 
training camps in Afghanistan have uncovered rudimentary laboratories for developing biological 
weapons. At the abu-Khabab terrorist camp, Al-Qaeda elements may have conducted tests on animals to 
investigate the effects of these agents. In terms of a nuclear weapons capability, there is little evidence to 
suggest that Al-Qaeda ever developed a nuclear explosive device. There are, however, several known 
instances in which Al-Qaeda members attempted to acquire uranium. Recently, troops investigating one 
camp close to the Kandahar airport found a substance in jars that is suspected to be depleted uranium. If 
this turns out to be true, it could mean that Al-Qaeda was attempting to develop a so-called "dirty bomb" 
intended to expose a large area to radiation. 
The U.S. strategy to deal with Al-Qaeda's potential WMD threat is to collect intelligence in Afghanistan, 
and to rely on friends and allies for help in stopping other Al-Qaeda cells from obtaining or using WMD. 
U.S. troops and intelligence officers are interviewing detainees for information, closing down and 
investigating terrorist training camps for more evidence of WMD production, and examining existing 
evidence to put together a better picture of what Al-Qaeda may have been capable of developing. 
Additionally, the Bush administration is using diplomatic measures in countries around the world to 
identify and close down other Al-Qaeda cells.  
Assessment 
Although it is difficult to assess Al-Qaeda's capacity to develop biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, 
it seems probable that the group would direct its efforts toward biological and chemical weapons, since 
these are easier to develop and simpler to deploy. It remains to be seen how successful U.S. efforts to 
stop Al-Qaeda from creating a WMD capability will be. Intelligence collection and analysis, and the 
cooperation of the international community, will be essential in this endeavor.  
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Iraq Returns to the Forefront 
Iraq continues to be a major concern for the United States. The current war against terrorism has again 
put the regime headed by Saddam Hussein at the top of the U.S. government's list of countries 
attempting clandestinely to develop WMD. On November 19, 2001, Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security John Bolton said, "The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has 
taken advantage of three years of no UN inspections to improve all phases of its offensive BW program. 
The existence of Iraq's program is beyond dispute, in complete contravention of the BWC [Biological 
Weapons Convention]." The United Nations stated that in the absence of inspections, Iraq has the ability 
to reconstitute its biological weapons program, including production of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and 
aflatoxins, within a few weeks or months.  
U.S. officials also believe that Iraq has retained the expertise needed to resume production of at least 
some chemical agents within a few months. As recently as 1999, Iraqi workers may have begun installing 
or repairing equipment at dual-use chemical warfare-associated facilities. Before the Persian Gulf War, 
the Iraqi regime was known to have produced and stockpiled mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX, some stocks 
of which are likely to be hidden away along with a variety of their precursor chemicals.  
As for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the Iraqi government claims that it has destroyed all the specific 
equipment and facilities that would be useful to develop nuclear weapons. Officials in the U.S. 
Department of Defense believe, however, that Iraq has retained the technical expertise and weapon 
designs that would allow it to restart its nuclear weapons program if scientists there could obtain fissile 
material.  
The strategy of the United States against Iraq and its WMD threat so far has been two-fold. Recently, 
President Bush stated that Iraq must allow weapons inspectors to return or face the consequences, but 
he did not say what those consequences would be. In addition, the Bush administration is pushing a plan 
for "smart sanctions" that target the Iraqi regime rather than its people. This plan would lift restrictions on 
civilian goods, but tighten controls on arms-related equipment and clamp down on oil smuggling.  
Assessment 
The United States continues to pursue competing policy objectives on Iraq. On the one hand it has 
apparently agreed to pursue a compromise with Russia and others on the Security Council to restructure 
the current oil-for-food program by widening the types of acquisitions Iraq could make with oil sales 
revenues. Under the plan, the virtual last remaining element in the sanctions regime would be an arms 
embargo. Should the Security Council reach agreement on “smart sanctions,” it is possible to foresee the 
partial reintegration of Iraq into the international community with Saddam still in power.  
While the United pursues consensus in the Security Council, it continues to actively promote regime 
change in Baghdad by working with the Iraqi opposition and various high-level government officials also 
continue to assert that Iraq remains a threat to international peace and security due to its unmonitored 
WMD programs.  
Eventually, these two approaches will have to be reconciled. 
However the United States proceeds on its policy, it is an abiding truism that a Saddam-lead Iraq retains 
the intent and the capability to use WMD as: (1) an instrument to coerce its neighbors and promote 
regional instability; (2) a concrete threat to the security of Israel; and (3) a last resort to preserve the 
regime. As long as Saddam remains in power, the WMD threat will endure, and he shows no sign of 
loosening his grip. 
The United States is faced with unattractive policy choices. President Bush’s recent statement that Iraq 
must allow the return of UN weapons inspectors or face unspecified consequences implies that 
UNMOVIC could actually perform a meaningful disarmament mission inside Iraq. The danger for the 
United States and the international community is that Iraq agrees to this request and that we see the 
recreation of the situation that existed in 1997 and 1998 in which it became apparent that Security 
Council would not back its own weapons inspectors in their attempts to receive the unfettered access 
needed to fulfill a meaningful disarmament mission. The Clinton Administration decided in late 1998 that 
no inspections were better than sham inspections.  
But pursuing a unilateral policy for regime change is equally problematic. Using the “opposition” is fraught 
with pitfalls. The Iraqi opposition in London remains disorganized and ineffective; the Shiite Marsh Arab 
opposition in the south is Iranian sponsored and at odds with the Sunni Arabs on the Arabian Peninsula; 
the Kurdish factions in the north have little incentive to undertake military action against Saddam, since 
US military assurances have already provided them with the defacto Kurdish state they have long sought. 
Attempts to tie military action on Iraq to the war on terrorism have failed, and there appears to be little 
international support for attacking Iraq on the basis of its WMD programs. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources and  
our WMD Proliferation Resources. 
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